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INTRODUCTION
A day in the life of Trevor Coston (T.C.) begins at a 7:00 a.m. meet-
ing with his supervisor.1  After his morning meeting, T.C. works on
various projects until 2:15 p.m.2  At 2:15 p.m., T.C. attends a prelimi-
nary conference before meeting with his supervisor again at 3:45 p.m.3
Two-hours and fifteen minutes later, T.C. finally ends his day at 6:00
p.m.4  T.C. spends, on average, about forty-three hours per week pre-
paring for and attending meetings.5  Since most full-time employed
people work about forty-hours per week,6 it would seem like T.C. is
an average full-time employee, right?  Wrong.
T.C. is a football player at a NCAA Division I University.7  But
T.C. is not just a football player; he is also a student.8  Not only does
he spend forty-three hours per week preparing for and attending foot-
ball practices and games, he also spends about thirty-eight hours per
week preparing for and attending classes.9  On average, T.C. spends
over eighty hours per week on both athletic and academic related ac-
tivities.10  One of the main differences between T.C. and a person who
holds two full-time jobs is that T.C. does not get paid—he is a NCAA
student-athlete, and as such, he must maintain his status as an ama-
teur, which excludes him from accepting all forms of compensation
except for scholarship money.11  Meanwhile, Division I universities
1. See Charlie Merritt, A Day in the Life of a Division 1 Football Player at UMaine, THE
MAINE CAMPUS (Nov. 3, 2010, 10:42 p.m.), http://mainecampus.com/2010/11/03/rammstein-dis-
cography/ (writing about his interview with Trevor Coston, a twenty-one year old football player
at the University of Maine).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; see also Division I Results from the NCAA GOALS Study on the Student-Athlete Expe-
rience, NCAA.ORG 17 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI_GOALS_FARA
_final_1.pdf (showing the results of an NCAA study into the life of a student-athlete at a Divi-
sion I university).
6. While the Fair Labor Standards Act does not define full-time employment or part-time
employment, the Act states that forty-hours per week is the maximum an employee can work
without receiving overtime compensation.  29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 207(a)(1) (2012); see also Wage and
Hour Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa (last vis-
ited Aug. 12, 2014).
7. Merritt, A Day in the Life of a Division 1 Football Player at UMaine, supra note 2.  The
NCAA describes Division I universities as having bigger student bodies than Division II and III
schools. See NCAA Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Aug
12, 2014) (noting that Division I schools also manage larger athletics budgets and offer a higher
number of scholarships).
8. Merritt, A Day in the Life of a Division 1 Football Player at UMaine, supra note 2.
9. Division I Results, supra note 6, at 18.
10. Id. at 20.
11. See 2013-2014 Guide for the College-Bound Student-Athlete, NCAA ELIGIBILITY CENTER
18, http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/CBSA.pdf (requiring student-athletes to
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and the NCAA are profiting off of the services rendered by student-
athletes just like T.C.12
Revenue brought in by ticket receipts, licensing fees, merchandise
sales, broadcasting rights, television contracts, and endorsement deals
have made NCAA Division I sports a multi-billion dollar industry.13
While uncompensated student-athletes are the source of this revenue,
they are in no position to bargain with their universities or the NCAA
because student-athletes are dependent upon their athletic scholar-
ships, which demand that a certain number of hours be dedicated to
their respective sports.14  Furthermore, student-athletes are subject to
rules and regulations that many believe to affect their health and
safety because they lack relative bargaining power against their uni-
versities and the NCAA.
Labor organizations such as the College Athletes Players Associa-
tion (CAPA) assert that student-athletes should be allowed to union-
ize and should be afforded collective bargaining rights.15  In recent
years, CAPA has moved for student-athletes to be considered “em-
ployees” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).16  As an employee under the NLRA, student-athletes would
maintain their amateur status by not accepting any forms of compensation in connection with
their athletic abilities).
12. See generally Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal
Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFFALO L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2012) (arguing
that student-athletes deserve collective bargaining rights because they allow their schools to
bring in so much revenue).
13. See College Athletics Revenues and Expenses-2008, ESPN COLLEGE SPORTS, http://espn.go
.com/ncaa/revenue (last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (estimating the total revenue for all Division 1
universities in 2008 to be well over five-billion dollars at least); see generally Fram & Frampton,
A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, supra note 13, at
1017-18.
14. See How Do Athletics Scholarships Work?, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/
files/NCAA%2BAthletics%2BScholarships.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2014) (noting that most
scholarships are granted for one academic year, to be determined by the coaching staff on a
year-by-year basis).  There is nothing in the Division I Manual prohibiting coaching staffs from
revoking athletic scholarships from athletes who get injured; however, the scholarships cannot
be revoked until the end of the scholarship term limit unless a student-athlete renders himself or
herself ineligible. 2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual, NCAA.ORG 199, 201 (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf; see generally Meghan Walsh, ‘I
Trusted ‘Em’: When NCAA Schools Abandon Their Injured Athletes, THE ATLANTIC (May 1,
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/05/i-trusted-em-when-ncaa-
schools-abandon-their-injured-athletes/275407/ (claiming that players who are enlisted “on the
promise of an education” may lose their scholarships if they get injured).
15. Why We’re Doing It, COLLEGE ATHLETES PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.col-
legeathletespa.org/why (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).
16. Northwestern Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1922054, at *1, 2 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 17,
2014) (hereinafter “CAPA’s Post-Hearing Brief”) (addressing the issue of student-athlete em-
ployee status on behalf of Northwestern University’s football team).  For general information
about the NLRA, see infra Part I.A.
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be given the chance to vote on whether they would like to be repre-
sented by a labor organization and decide which union would re-
present them for the purpose of bargaining with their employers, the
universities.17
On January 28, 2014, CAPA filed a petition with Region 13 of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)18 on behalf of the North-
western University football team.19  In its petition, CAPA claimed
that the Northwestern University football players receiving grant-in-
aid scholarships from their employer, Northwestern University, were
considered employees within the meaning of the NLRA.20  CAPA
then asserted that as employees, the football players on scholarship
should be entitled to choose whether they would like collective bar-
gaining rights.21  In response to CAPA’s petition, Region 13 agreed
and held that Northwestern’s scholarship-holding football players
were statutory employees.22 However, on April 24, 2014, the National
Labor Relations Board in Washington, D.C. (the Board) granted re-
view of Region 13’s decision.23
Based on precedent, it is likely that the Board will reverse Region
13’s decision because Northwestern’s football players are primarily
students, and as such, they are excluded from employee status under
the NLRA.24  However, due to recent controversy over the Presi-
dent’s recess appointments of current Board members, Region 13’s
decision could also be affirmed.25  Ultimately, the final determination
17. If student-athletes are deemed employees, and they vote for representation, universities
would be obligated to bargain with the representatives. See discussion infra Part I.B.
18. Region 13 is located in Chicago, Illinois and it serves parts of Illinois and Indiana. See
Who We Are, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/region/chicago (last
visited Aug. 13, 2014) (informing potential petitioners that Region 13 is responsible for con-
ducting elections, investigating charges of unfair labor practices, and protecting the collective
bargaining rights of employees).  When a union representative wants to file a petition with the
NLRB, he or she will do so through one of the NLRB’s regional offices. See generally infra Part
I.B.
19. Northwestern Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1246914, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014)
(hereinafter “Region 13’s Decision”).
20. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at *2.
21. Id.
22. Id. For discussion of Region 13’s decision, see infra Part III.C.
23. Northwestern Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1653118, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 24, 2014)
(hereinafter “NLRB Grant of Review”).  As of July 8, 2014, all parties and amici had filed the
necessary documents for the Board to review.
24. For analysis of relevant Board precedent, see infra Part II.
25. See Lawrence E. Dube, Obama Will Again Nominate Block to NLRB; Attorney Held Inva-
lid Recess Appointment, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 14, 2014), http://www.bna.com/obama-again-
nominate-n17179892243/ (noting President Obama’s attempt to get Senate confirmation of a
new Board nominee which could ensure “the [B]oard’s 3-2 Democratic majority for at least
several more years”).
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of employee status lies with the Board.  Will Northwestern Univer-
sity’s scholarship football players remain a unified team or will they
transform into a unionized regime?
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the NLRA and the
creation of the NLRB.  Part II surveys past NLRB decisions, focusing
on the methods used by the NLRB to determine whether university-
employed students are employees within the meaning of the NLRA.
Part III explains Region 13’s determination of the employee status of
Northwestern University’s scholarship football players.  Part IV dis-
cusses the arguments of both parties to the Northwestern case.  Part V
analyzes the validity of the parties’ arguments and Region 13’s reason-
ing, and makes the argument that NLRB precedent does not support
the unionization of student-athletes.  Finally, Part VI considers the
likelihood of Board reversal and concludes by assessing the future of
collective bargaining rights in the realm of university athletics.
I. JULY 5, 1935:  THE NLRA, THE BOARD, AND WHAT IT MEANS
TO BE AN EMPLOYEE
A. The Labor Movement and the Passage of the NLRA
The Industrial Revolution marked a major turning point in the
American economy.  While factory growth created many new employ-
ment opportunities for the masses that flocked to major U.S. cities,
these new opportunities came with a price.  Factory workers were sub-
jected to harsh working conditions that they were powerless to
change. 26  Trade unions dedicated to improving working conditions
existed at the time, although participation was sparse.27  As working
conditions worsened and employers continued to underpay their
workers, the labor movement gained momentum which caused ten-
sions to rise between employees and employers.28
26. JAMES STUART OLSEN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA
248 (Robert L. Shadle ed. 2002) (describing that it was common for factory employees to work
sixteen-hour days in crowded factories that did not have adequate air ventilation or any other
safety precautions).
27. A few trade unions in existence include the National Labor Union Trade, the Knights of
Labor, and the American Federation of Labor. See Grant W. Murray, A Brief History of Labor
Unions in the United States 2 (date accessed July 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Northern Michigan University), available at http://ellerbruch.nmu.edu/classes/cs255w02/cs255stu
dents/GMURRAY/p11/history.pdf.
28. See id. at 2-3 (stating that unions became proactive by utilizing the strike as a mechanism
for fighting back against employers and urging Congress to pass pro-labor legislation).
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In 1914, labor unions gained a huge victory when Congress passed
the Clayton Act, which legalized the use of strikes and boycotts.29  A
few years later, the War Labor Board (WLB) was created to promote
labor peace.30  The WLB had no enforcement powers; however, for
the first time in American history, Congress recognized employees’
rights to unionize and participate in collective bargaining through cho-
sen representatives.31  In 1926, Congress passed the Railway Labor
Act, which stressed the importance of collective bargaining as a tool.32
Despite legislation recognizing employees’ rights to unionize, employ-
ers refused to engage in collective bargaining with employees.33 This
non-compliance with national labor policy motivated American
lawmakers to reform labor legislation.
In 1935, Senator Robert F. Wagner introduced the National Labor
Relations Act, which proposed to protect employees’ rights to union-
ize and enforce employers’ obligations to bargain collectively with
union representatives.34  Additionally, the NLRA proposed to create
the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), an independent ad-
ministrative agency tasked with the responsibility to enforce collec-
tive-bargaining rights for the purpose of protecting the general
welfare of employees, employers, and the United States economy.35
After passing the Senate and clearing the House of Representa-
tives, President Roosevelt signed the NLRA into law on July 5, 1935.36
Two years after its enactment, the NLRA and the Board gained legiti-
macy when the United States Supreme Court declared the NLRA
constitutional.37
29. See id. at 3; see also 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (permitting labor organizations “to carry out
their legitimate objectives”).
30. See Pre-Wagner Act Labor Relations, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www
.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/pre-wagner-act-labor-relations (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See The NLB and “The Old NLRB”, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www
.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/nlb-and-old-nlrb (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
34. See The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://
www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
35. What We Do, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do
(last visited July 19, 2014).
36. The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, supra note 35.
37. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 40, 43 (1937) (holding that
Congress has the power to regulate anything that has a close and substantial relationship to
commerce and that includes labor) (“we have no doubt that Congress had constitutional author-
ity to safeguard the right of respondent’s employees to self-organization and freedom in the
choice of representatives for collective bargaining.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPS\11-1\DPS101.txt unknown Seq: 7  7-MAY-15 10:46
2015] NORTHWESTERN’S FOOTBALL PLAYERS 7
B. The Board’s Process
The Board is an independent federal agency, comprised of five
members that are appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.38  The Board also has twenty regional offices in more than
fifteen states.39  The Board and its regional offices are vested with the
power to safeguard employees’ rights to organize and to determine
whether to have unions as their bargaining representative.40
When a group of employees seek to be represented as a collective
bargaining unit, they must hold an election to vote on a union repre-
sentative.41  In order to vote, the group of employees must first file a
petition with its regional office.42  Once the group files a petition, the
regional office conducts an investigation and decides whether to ac-
cept or dismiss the petition.43  If the regional office accepts the peti-
tion, it then conducts formal proceedings.44  After the formal
proceedings, the Regional Director issues a decision either directing
an election or dismissing the case.45  Parties may request review of the
Regional Director’s decision by the Board.46  If the Board denies re-
view, the decision of the Regional Office stands.47  If the Board grants
review, it issues a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing the Re-
gional Director’s decision.48  If the Board’s decision favors the em-
ployees, the Board orders that an election be conducted, in which case
the employees will vote on whether or not they want to pursue collec-
tive-bargaining rights with their employer and who will represent
them.49
38. See The NLB and “The Old NLRB,” supra note 34.
39. See Regional Offices, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/regional-offices (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
40. See The NLRB Process, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/re
sources/nlrb-process (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
41. An election is held for the purpose of determining whether a group of employees want
collective bargaining rights and what union it wants to represent its interests when bargaining
with its employer. See id.
42. See id.
43. The Board will accept or deny a petition based on jurisdiction, union qualification, and
contractual obligation. See Conduct Elections, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://
www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections (last visited Aug. 13, 2014).
44. Formal proceedings involve hearings in which each party will come before a regional of-
fice and give testimony. See The NLRB Process, supra note 41.
45. See id.
46. Parties opposing the request for review are allowed to file a brief in opposition with the
Board. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Id. If a majority of the bargaining unit votes in favor of unionization, the employer is
obligated to engage in collective bargaining with the elected representative. See How Do Unions
Work?, UNION PLUS, http://www.unionplus.org/about/labor-unions/how-do-unions-work (last
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Underlying the Board’s determination of whether a group of em-
ployees has the right to pursue collective-bargaining rights with their
employers is the NLRA’s meaning of the term “employee.”  If an in-
dividual is an employee within the meaning of the NLRA, the Board
will enforce that employee’s rights under the NLRA.  However, the
NLRA offers little clarification of the term “employee,” thus leaving
it up to the Board to determine “employee” status.
C. Employee Status
The NLRA’s definition of “employee,” which is meant to clarify
who is considered an employee, is anything but helpful.  The term
“employee” is circularly defined by the NLRA as “any employee.”50
If a person is deemed an employee, that person falls under the protec-
tion of the NLRA, as enforced by the Board.  The NLRA specifically
excludes certain individuals from employee status.51  However, it is
unclear who is actually included in the definition.  Due to the vague
definition of employee, the Board has had an arduous time determin-
ing who falls within the NLRA’s meaning.  Subsequently, the United
States Supreme Court (Court) has played a crucial role in helping to
define and give meaning to the term “employee.”52
When the Court attempts to define statutory language, it occasion-
ally looks to the dictionary.  In NLRB v. Town & Country Electric,
Inc.,53 the Court cited to the ordinary definition of the term “em-
ployee,” which defines an employee as any “person who works for
another in return for financial or other compensation.”54  In the same
visited Aug. 13, 2014) (noting that most union representatives bargain for better employment
terms and conditions such as wages, hours, and benefits, but that employers do not have to agree
to any specific terms).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012) (“the term ‘employee’ shall include any employee”).
51. The NLRA excludes independent contractors, agricultural laborers, domestic workers,
and employees subject to the Railway Labor Act. See id.
52. See NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995) (including paid union
workers to the NLRA definition of “employee”); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)
(including undocumented aliens to the NLRA definition of “employee”); NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (excluding employees of religious institutions from the
NLRA definition of “employee”); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971) (excluding retired persons from the NLRA definition of “em-
ployee”); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (including company foreman to
the NLRA definition of “employee”); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 11 (1944)
(including independent contractors to the NLRA definition of “employee”); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (including job applicants to the NLRA definition of “em-
ployee). But see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (amending NLRA to overrule Packard and Hearst by explic-
itly excluding supervisory employees and independent contractors from the NLRA definition of
“employee”).
53. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
54. Id. at 90 (citing to the American Heritage Dictionary, 604 (3d ed. 1992)).
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case, the Court noted that, usually, when Congress leaves the term
“employee” undefined in a statute, it is assumed that Congress meant
to describe an employee using the common law agency doctrine.55
The Court stated that while the common law definition of the term
“employee” seems to coincide with the “breadth of the ordinary defi-
nition,”56 deference should be given to the Board’s construction of the
word since Congress created the Board to administer the NLRA.57
Recognizing that “the Board often possesses a degree of legal leeway”
when it interprets the NLRA, the Court rejected the common law
construction of the term “employee” and gave precedent to the
Board’s interpretation.58
Many years of previous Board decisions have helped give definition
to the term “employee.”  When considering the ordinary definition,59
the Board’s determination of employee status might be relatively easy
in cases involving traditional groups of workers.  For example, retired
persons are excluded from the NLRA definition of “employee” be-
cause they are no longer working for an employer for compensation.60
Similarly, the Board determined that paid union workers fell within
the terms of the NLRA because they could still be hired by another
employer to do work for compensation.61  In these cases, the Board’s
construction of the term “employee” coincides with the common law
agency doctrine.62  However, the Board’s determination of employee
status becomes more difficult when the consideration involves non-
traditional workers.
Accordingly, the Board may depart from the common law defini-
tion to determine the employee status of these unorthodox groups.
55. The common law agency doctrine compared the employer-employee relationship to the
conventional master-servant relationship, which exists when the servant performs services for
the master, under the master’s control, and in return for compensation. See id. at 94.
56. Id. at 90 (defining an employee as any “person who works for another in return for finan-
cial or other compensation”).
57. Id. at 94.
58. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. at 89-90, 94; see, e.g. Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at
891 (asserting that the Board’s interpretation of the term employee will be upheld if reasonably
defensible); see generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (declaring that an agency’s construction of a statutory term is given “controlling
weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
59. Any “person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation.” See
Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. at 90 (citing to the American Heritage Dictionary 604
(3d ed. 1992).
60. The Board amended the NLRA to specifically exclude retired persons after the Court, in
Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America, decided to include them in the definition of em-
ployee.  404 U.S. at 166.
61. See Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. at 90-91.
62. See cases cited supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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For instance, supervisory employees perform services for their em-
ployers and receive compensation for those services.  Despite accor-
dance with the common law structure, the Board amended the NLRA
to explicitly exclude supervisory employees from the definition of
“employee.”63  Likewise, the Board departed from the common law
agency doctrine to exclude individuals employed by religious institu-
tions even though compensation may be exchanged for services per-
formed.64  The Board has also included job applicants to the NLRA
definition of “employee,” despite the fact that they have technically
not been hired by an employer nor have they received compensation
for work.65  Similarly, undocumented aliens have been considered em-
ployees within the meaning of the NLRA although it is technically
illegal for an employer to hire an undocumented non-citizen.66
As demonstrated, the Board’s departure from the common law
structure has been the trend when dealing with unorthodox groups of
workers.  One unorthodox group of workers that the Board has dealt
with frequently throughout the past forty years is college students.  In
line with past decisions, the Board has departed from its use of the
common law agency doctrine when determining the employee status
of college students.
II. THE COLLEGE YEARS:  THE BOARD AND
THE UNIVERSITY CASES
Starting in the 1970s, the Board was tasked with the responsibility
of determining the employee status of individuals who are not only
employed by educational institutions, but are also enrolled as students
at the same universities or colleges.67  When dealing with these types
of cases, the Board’s precedent shows a departure from the common
law agency doctrine.68  Behind the Board’s inquiry is whether the indi-
vidual in question shares a predominantly academic relationship with
the educational institution.69
Until the late 1990s, the Board’s established principle indicated that
students employed by the same school they were enrolled in were not
63. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).
64. See Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. at 490 (recognizing that allowing NLRA protection
of religious institutions would possibly conflict with the guarantees of the First Amendment).
65. See Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 177 (agreeing with the Board’s inclusion of job
applicants).
66. See Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 883 (agreeing with the Board’s inclusion of undocumented
aliens).
67. See Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972); see also discussion infra Part II.A.
68. See discussion infra Part II.A, II.B, II.C.
69. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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statutory employees because they were “primarily students.”70  But,
with each new case came factual nuances, which have led to a weak-
ened Board’s precedent by the end of the twentieth century.71  Instead
of applying its own established precedent, the Board reverted back to
using the common law agency doctrine to determine the employee sta-
tus of student-employees.72  Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, the
Board returned to its initial inquiry and explicitly rejected the use of
the common law structure when determining the employee status of
university-employed students.73  Since 2004, the Board’s precedent
has been that individuals employed by and enrolled as students, at the
same educational institution are not employees within the meaning of
the NLRA because they share a predominantly academic relationship
with their universities and colleges.74
The Board’s tumultuous handling of these cases reflects public pol-
icy concerns involving the university-student relationship.75  The gen-
eral fear is that if university-employed students are granted employee
status under the NLRA, it might undermine the traditional educa-
tional relationship between the university and the student.76  Of par-
ticular importance is how the Board has grappled with these public
policy concerns when the traditional roles of university-employed stu-
dents change.
Recently, the Board has faced questions involving the employee
status of student-athletes who, while not employed by their universi-
ties, are paid by them for services performed. 77  Before the Board can
determine the employee status of student-athletes, it must first ana-
lyze its own precedent.  While the Board does not have precedent per-
taining to student-athletes, it does have forty-years of past decisions
involving college students, which can be applied to cases involving stu-
dent-athletes.
70. See id.
71. See discussion infra Part II.B.
72. See id.
73. See discussion infra Part II.C.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. The services performed are the duties related to the athletes’ sports, and the payment is in
the form of scholarships and stipends. See generally sources cited supra notes 14-15 and accom-
panying text.
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A. The Leland Stanford Principle
In 1972, the Board was presented with the question of whether
graduate assistants employed by Adelphi University (Adelphi)78, who
were also enrolled graduate students at the University, should be in-
cluded in the bargaining unit of regular faculty.79  Instead of referring
to the common law agency doctrine to make its determination, the
Board considered many factors including time spent on services versus
time spent on educational requirements, payments for services per-
formed, and the graduate assistants’ relationship to the regular
faculty.80
The Board rejected the argument that Adelphi’s graduate assistants
enjoyed “a community of interest with the regular faculty,” because
the graduate assistants did not enjoy any of the benefits offered to the
regular faculty.81  Unlike the regular faculty members, Adelphi’s grad-
uate assistants were “guided, instructed, assisted, and corrected in the
performance of their assistantship duties by the regular faculty mem-
bers to whom they were assigned.”82  Furthermore, the Board noted
that Adelphi’s graduate assistants had to be enrolled as students at the
University before they could actually be employed by it.83  The Board
found that Adelphi’s graduate assistants were primarily students be-
cause they did not share a community of interest with Adelphi’s regu-
lar faculty and their employment was contingent upon their continued
status as students.84  Accordingly, the Board excluded Adelphi’s grad-
uate assistants from the bargaining unit of regular faculty.85
78. Adelphi University is a private educational institution located in Long Island, New York.
See Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 639.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 640.
81. Id. (noting that the graduate assistants “do not have faculty rank, are not listed in the
University’s catalogues as faculty members, have no vote at faculty meetings, are not eligible for
promotion or tenure, are not covered by the University personnel plan, have no standing before
the University’s grievance committee, and . . . do not participate in any of the fringe benefits
available to faculty members,” except for University health insurance).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 640.
85. As a basis for its holding, the Board cited to two decisions from the previous year. Id. at
n. 8.  In C.W. Post Center of Long Island University, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971), the Board allowed
the employee status of one research associate; however, the Board in Adelphi noted that, unlike
Adelphi’s graduate assistants, the research associate was not simultaneously a student. Id.  In
Long Island University (Brooklyn Center), 189 N.L.R.B. 909 (1971), the Board denied the em-
ployee status of the University’s technical laboratory assistants. Id.  Similar to Adelphi’s gradu-
ate assistants, the lab assistants were enrolled at the University, pursuing advanced degrees, and
were performing services to assist regular faculty members. Id.
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Two years later, the Board reaffirmed and reinforced Adelphi’s
holding when graduate assistants at The Leland Stanford University
(Stanford)86 petitioned the Board for employee status.87  Similar to
the graduate assistants in Adelphi, Stanford’s graduate assistants were
employed by and enrolled as students at the University.88  To make its
determination, the Board considered the relationship between the stu-
dent and the university instead of analyzing employee status with the
common law structure.89  The Board considered many of the same fac-
tors as it did in Adelphi90, but its analysis was focused primarily on the
nature of the payments received by the graduate assistants in relation
to the services they performed.91
The Board rejected the argument that the payments received by
Stanford’s graduate assistants were directly related to services they
performed, and as such the graduate assistants were employees within
the meaning of the NLRA.92  Instead, the Board considered the pay-
ments to be financial aid that the graduate assistants used to pursue
their own academic degrees rather than wages in exchange for work.93
Furthermore, the Board found that Stanford’s graduate assistants
did not share a community of interest with the University’s regular
faculty.94  While the graduate assistants did not enjoy regular faculty
benefits such as vacation time, sick leave, and retirement options, they
did enjoy many benefits of being a student such as access to student
housing, healthcare, and campus activities.95  Of greater significance
to the Board was the fact that Stanford’s graduate assistants’ pay-
ments were tax exempt, unlike regular faculty wages.96  The Board
asserted that Stanford’s graduate assistants, like the graduate assist-
ants in Adelphi, were primarily students because they lacked a com-
munity of interest with the University’s regular faculty.97
Subsequently, the Board found that Stanford’s research assistants had
a predominantly academic, rather than economic, relationship with
86. The Leland Stanford Junior University is a private educational institution located in Stan-
ford, California. See The Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
87. Id. at 621.
88. Id. at 621.
89. Id. at 622-23.
90. See cases cited supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622.
92. Id. at 622-23.
93. Id. at 621.
94. Id. at 621-22.
95. Id. at 622.
96. Id.
97. Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 623.
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the University.98  Going one step further than its holding in Adelphi,
the Board not only excluded Stanford’s graduate assistants from the
bargaining unit of regular faculty, but it also held that students em-
ployed by and enrolled at the same university are not employees
within the meaning of the NLRA because they are primarily
students.99
Shortly after Stanford, Congress amended the NLRA to include
nonprofit hospitals and their employees.100  This amendment led to
the integration of millions of new workers into the protection of the
NLRA.101  In 1976 and 1977, the Board was faced with the question of
whether it would extend Stanford to exclude medical interns, re-
sidents, and fellows (house staff members) from employee status
under the NLRA.102  Following Stanford’s analysis instead of the com-
mon law structure, the Board found that the house staff members
were primarily students rather than employees because they were en-
gaged in educational courses.103
To make its decision, the Board also considered relevant policy con-
cerns and the intended purpose of the NLRA.104  The Board declared
that the NLRA was intended to cover predominantly economic, not
academic, relationships, and allowing collective bargaining rights
would infringe upon the academic freedoms of the educational institu-
tion.105  For over the next two decades, the Board’s departure from
the common law agency doctrine and its reliance on the Stanford Prin-
ciple106 went undisturbed.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See St. Clare’s Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).
101. Id. at 1000.
102. See id.; Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976).
103. St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003-04; Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
104. St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003-04; Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253-54.
105. St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003-04; Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253-54.
106. The basic premise of the Stanford Principal is that if a university-employee, who is also
enrolled as a student at university, is “primarily” a student, the individual is not a statutory
employee under the NLRA. See Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622-23 (stating that a university-
employed student is considered to be primarily a student if the relationship between the individ-
ual and the university is more academic than economic).  The relationship between the univer-
sity and the university-employed student is predominantly academic if (1) the individual is
enrolled as a student at the university; (2) the individual enjoys the benefits made available to all
students; (3) the individual does not share a community of interest with the regular faculty; (4)
the individual’s job at the university is contingent upon the continued enrollment as a student;
(5) the payments received by the individual are not based on the nature of the services per-
formed; and/or (6) the services performed further the individual’s academic career. See id. at
622-23 (mentioning that the Board also considers the intended purpose of the NLRA when
determining employee status).
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B. Unprecedented Change:  BMC and NYU
In 1999, the Board was presented with the question of whether
medical interns, residents, and fellows at Boston Medical Center
(BMC)107 were employees within the meaning of the NLRA.108  Un-
like the graduate assistants in Adelphi and Stanford, BMC’s house
staff members received their advanced degrees prior to being em-
ployed by the Hospital, where they continued their medical train-
ing.109  While employed at BMC, the house staff members were
enrolled in medical classes to supplement their practical training.110
The Board rejected the argument that just because BMC’s house staff
members were engaged in educational courses they were primarily
students.111  Considering the common law agency doctrine for the first
time since Adelphi and Stanford, the Board found that the house staff
members provided services for, and under the control of, BMC in re-
turn for compensation.112  However, the Board still considered
whether BMC shared a predominantly economic or academic rela-
tionship with its house staff members.113
Unlike the graduate assistants in Adelphi and Stanford, BMC’s
house staff members received payments directly related to the services
they performed, and the payments they received were subject to taxa-
tion.114  The house staff members spent more time engaged in their
house staff duties than they did on educational training, and they en-
joyed the same benefits as other hospital employees, including work-
ers’ compensation, paid vacation time, and insurance coverage.115
The Board found that the relationship between BMC and its house
staff members was predominantly economic, not academic, because
they shared a community of interest with the regular faculty.116
Similar to Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s, the Board also considered
relevant policy concerns and the intended purpose of the NLRA.117
Finding a predominantly economic, rather than academic, relationship
between BMC and its house staff members, the Board concluded that
107. Boston Medical Center is a nonprofit teaching hospital located in Boston, Massachusetts.
See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
108. Id. at 152.
109. Id. at 152-56.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 160-61.
112. Id.
113. BMC, 330 N.L.R.B. at 160-61.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 163-65.
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it would not be contrary to the intended purpose of the NLRA if it
allowed them collective bargaining rights.118  Therefore, the Board
held that BMC’s interns, residents, and fellows were employees within
the meaning of the NLRA.119
One-year later, the Board used BMCs reasoning to grant employee
status to graduate assistants at New York University (NYU).120  Like
the graduate students in Adelphi and Stanford, NYU’s graduate assist-
ants were employed by and enrolled as students at NYU.121  Similarly,
NYU’s graduate assistants also received payments for the services
they performed, in the form of scholarships and stipends.122  While the
Board found that NYU’s graduate assistants were primarily students,
it rejected the argument that the graduate assistants could not be stat-
utory employees under the common law.123 As it did in BMC, the
Board relied on the common law agency doctrine to find that NYU’s
graduate assistants performed services for the University, under its ex-
clusive control, and in return for compensation.124  However, the
Board still considered whether NYU’s graduate assistants shared a
predominantly academic relationship with the University.125
The Board stated that although the graduate assistants were prima-
rily students, the services they performed were not predominantly ed-
ucational because the services were not required to obtain a NYU
degree.126  Furthermore, the Board reasoned that since the graduate
assistants were not required to perform services to obtain an academic
degree, they were working in exchange for pay, not in the pursuit of
education.127  The Board concluded that NYU and its graduate assist-
ants shared a predominantly economic, employer-employee relation-
ship, not an academic relationship.128  Citing to the Supreme Court,
the Board reasoned that the NLRA broadly defines the term “em-
ployee” to include “any employee” unless explicitly excluded.129  Ac-
cordingly, the Board held that because the NLRA does not explicitly
exclude graduate assistants from the definition of “employee,” gradu-
118. Id. (noting that the intended purpose of the NLRA is to cover economic relationships).
119. BMC, 330 N.L.R.B. at 152 (overruling Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare’s).
120. New York University is a private educational institution located in New York City, New
York. See New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000).
121. Id. at 1205.
122. Id. at 1206.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1205-06.
125. Id. at 1207-09.
126. NYU, 332 N.L.R.B. at 1207-09.
127. Id. at 1206-07.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1205 (citing to Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 883).
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ate assistants “plainly and literally fall within the meaning” of the
NLRA.130
While the Board did not overrule Adelphi or Leland Stanford, its
decision in NYU reversed over twenty-five years of Board precedent
by asserting that, under the common law agency doctrine, graduate
assistants employed by and enrolled at the same university are em-
ployees within the meaning of the NLRA even though they are prima-
rily students.131  Nonetheless, four years later, the Board changed its
mind yet again.132
C. Brown and the Return to Pre-NYU Precedent
In 2004, the Board was presented with the question of whether
graduate assistants employed by Brown University (Brown),133 also
enrolled as graduate students at the University, were employees
within the meaning of the NLRA.134  The Board prefaced its analysis
with the assertion that it does not have jurisdiction over relationships
that are primarily educational.135  Rejecting the strict structural analy-
sis of the common law agency doctrine, the Board analyzed the rela-
tionship between the students and the University in accordance with
its pre-NYU decisions.136  To determine if Brown and its graduate as-
sistants shared a predominantly academic relationship, the Board con-
sidered the following four factors: (1) the graduate assistants’ status as
students; (2) the role the graduate assistants’ duties in their education;
(3) the community of interest shared by the graduate assistants and
the regular faculty; and (4) the nature of the payments received by the
graduate assistants.137
Considering the first factor, the Board focused on the undisputed
fact that Brown’s graduate assistants were students who had to be en-
rolled at the University before being employed by the University.138
Therefore, the Board concluded that the graduate assistants were pri-
marily students.139  Considering the second factor, the Board also
noted that the graduate assistants spent the majority amount of their
130. Id. at 1206.
131. Id. at 1205-06.
132. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
133. Brown University is a private educational institution located in Providence, Rhode Is-
land. See id. at 484.
134. Id. at 483.
135. Id. at 488.
136. Id. at  488-89.
137. Id.
138. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 488.
139. Id.
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time on the courses they were enrolled in at the University, rather
than their assistantship duties, and, therefore, their duties were merely
one aspect of their degree requirements.140  The Board then consid-
ered whether the graduate assistants and the regular faculty shared a
community of interest.141
The Board found that, similar to the research assistants in Adelphi
and Stanford, Brown’s graduate assistants enjoyed the many benefits
of being a student, such as access to student housing, healthcare, and
campus activities.142  Likewise, the Board noted that the graduate as-
sistants did not enjoy regular faculty benefits such as vacation time,
sick leave, and retirement options.143  The Board also noted that a
significant difference between Brown’s regular faculty and its gradu-
ate assistants was the difference between the types of payments re-
ceived.144  Unlike regular faculty wages, Brown’s graduate assistants
received payments in the form of scholarship and stipends, which were
tax exempt.145
Considering the last factor of its analysis, the Board noted that in
order to receive payments, Brown’s graduate assistants first had to be
enrolled at the University.146  The Board also found that the amount
received by the graduate assistants was not dependent upon how well
they performed their duties or how much time they spent performing
their duties.147  Accordingly, the Board stated that the graduate assist-
ants’ payments were not based on the nature of the services they per-
formed.148  Concluding its four-factor analysis, the Board held that
Brown’s graduate assistants had a predominantly academic, rather
than economic, relationship with the University.149
In addition to its analysis, the Board also considered the relevant
policy concerns and the intended purpose of the NLRA.150  Citing to
the Supreme Court, the Board stated that “the Court has recognized
that principles developed for use in the industrial setting cannot be
‘imposed blindly on the academic world.’”151  The Board declared
that the intended purpose of the NLRA was to cover economic rela-
140. Id. at 488-89.
141. Id. at 489.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 489.
145. Id. at 489.
146. Id. at 488.
147. Id. at 489.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 487-88.
151. Id. at 487 (citing to NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980)).
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tionships between employers and employees.152  Finding that the
graduate assistants and the educational institution share mutual aca-
demic interests, the Board determined that it would be detrimental, to
both labor and educational policies, if the emphasis of that relation-
ship changed from an academic one to an economic one.153  The
Board concluded that predominantly academic interests “are com-
pletely foreign to the normal employment relationship and . . . are not
readily adaptable to the collective-bargaining process.”154
Throughout its decision, the Board criticized its own reasoning in
NYU and its use of the common law agency doctrine.155  In Brown,
the Board not only rejected the common law structure but also stated
that even if the graduate assistants were employees at common law,
they were not employees within the meaning of the NLRA.156  The
Board held that its determination of employee status is dependent
upon whether Congress intended to include graduate assistants, and
that its determination is not based solely on common law concepts.157
Finding that the graduate assistants were primarily students who en-
joyed a predominantly educational relationship with Brown, the
Board denied employee status, rejected the use of the common law
agency doctrine, and overruled NYU.158
Since its decision in 2004, the Board has relied on its reasoning es-
tablished in Brown.  However, in 2014, the Board denied review of a
regional decision, which held that medical interns, residents, and fel-
lows at the Beth Israel Medical Center were employees within the
meaning of the NLRA.159  As the dissent noted, review should have
been granted because BMC and Brown were incorrectly applied and
that this incorrect application could lead to conflicting standards of
law.160  Furthermore, the dissent argued that review should have been
granted because the Board had recently granted review in Northwest-
ern University, and it invited parties to file briefs on the application of
Brown as it related to student-athletes at private universities.161
152. Id. (“The Act was premised on the view that there is a fundamental conflict between the
interests of the employers and employees . . .”).
153. Id. at 487-88.
154. Id. at 488.
155. Id. at 491.
156. Brown, 342 N.L.R.B. at 491.
157. Id. at 491.
158. Id. at 483.
159. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., No. 02-RC-121992, 2014 WL 21612758, at *1 (N.L.R.B. June 11,
2014).
160. Id. at 1.
161. Id.
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III. MARCH 26, 2014:  REGION 13’S DECISION
IN NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
A. The Contenders
On January 28, 2014, CAPA filed a petition with Region 13 on be-
half of the Northwestern University football team.162  In its petition,
CAPA claimed that the Northwestern University football players
(football players) receiving grant-in-aid scholarships (scholarships)
from their employer, Northwestern University (Northwestern), are
“employees” within the meaning of the NLRA; and, as such, should
be entitled to choose whether they would like collective-bargaining
rights.163  CAPA relied on the common law agency doctrine for its
determination of employee status.164  Under this doctrine, CAPA ar-
gued that the football players were employees because they per-
formed services for and under the control of Northwestern in return
for compensation.165
Abiding by the Board’s process, 166 Region 13 investigated CAPA’s
claims, heard testimony from both parties, and allowed both parties to
file post-hearing briefs before making its decision.  Throughout Re-
gion 13’s investigation, Northwestern asserted that its scholarship
football players were primarily students, not statutory employees.167
Relying on the Board’s decision in Brown, Northwestern argued that
its football players had a predominantly academic, rather than eco-
nomic, relationship with the University.168  Northwestern rejected
CAPA’s use of the common law agency doctrine and instead argued
that the Board had never applied the common law test to determine
the employee status of students.169
B. And the Winner Is . . .
On March 26, 2014, Region 13 held that Northwestern’s scholarship
football players were employees within the meaning of the NLRA.170
Beginning its analysis, Region 13 placed the burden of proof on
Northwestern to establish its justification for excluding its scholarship
162. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at 1.
163. Id. at 2.
164. CAPA’s Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 17, at 16.
165. Id. at 17-24
166. See discussion supra Part I.B.
167. Brief to the Regional Director on Behalf of Northwestern University, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD 2 (Mar. 17, 2014) (hereinafter “Northwestern’s Post-Hearing Brief”), http://
www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359?page=4.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id. at 47, 51-52.
170. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at 1.
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football players from employee status.171  Region 13 declared that
Northwestern failed to meet its burden.172
In its Decision and Direction of Election, Region 13 applied the
common law agency doctrine to find that Northwestern’s scholarship
football players were statutory employees because they performed
services for and under the control of the University in return for com-
pensation.173  Region 13 asserted that the football players provided
services for Northwestern, which allowed the University to bring in
millions of dollars in revenue.174  Moreover, Region 13 found that the
football players were subject to special rules under the direct supervi-
sion of the coaching staff. 175  Region 13 also found that the football
players’ scholarships were similar to wages because they were directly
related to the services the athletes performed.176
In consideration of the common law test, Region 13 focused much
of its attention on the compensation aspect.177  Arguing that the schol-
arships were directly related to services performed, Region 13 as-
serted that the football players were recruited only for their athletic
abilities.178  Region 13 also argued that the scholarships were directly
related to services performed because the coaching staff could imme-
diately reduce or cancel the scholarship amount for a variety of rea-
sons.179  While only two football players lost their scholarships in the
past five years, Region 13 explained that the scholarships were di-
rectly related to services performed because there is an imminent
threat of amount reduction or cancellation.180  For Region 13, the
compensation aspect of the common law structure was the sole distin-
guishing factor between the scholarship football players and the
“walk-on” players.181  To that end, Region 13 denied walk-on players
171. Id. at 11 (asserting that “A party seeking to exclude an otherwise eligible employee from
coverage of the Act bears the burden of establishing a justification for the exclusion”).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 12.
174. Id. (observing that from 2003 to 2012, Northwestern’s football program generated ap-
proximately $235 million in revenue).
175. Id. at 13-14 (finding that the coaching staff prepared daily schedules for the football
players, and that the football players had to adhere to rules which only applied to them, such as
obtaining permission before traveling off campus or speaking to the media).
176. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at 13 (arguing that the football players work in
exchange for compensation, not an educational pursuit, because they do not get academic credit
for the services they perform).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Walk-on players are allowed to try out for the team after they have been admitted to
Northwestern, but they do not get scholarship money for playing on the team. Id. at 15.
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employee status “for the fundamental reason that they do not receive
compensation for the athletic services that they perform.”182
Continuing its analysis, Region 13 rejected the application of
Brown, arguing that, unlike Brown’s graduate assistants who per-
formed services related to their degree requirements, Northwestern’s
football players performed services unrelated to their academic stud-
ies.183  Region 13 declared that the common law agency doctrine was
applicable, stating that the Supreme Court necessitates its use when
“employee” is left undefined by Congress.184  Region 13 argued, how-
ever, that, even if Brown were applicable, the football players would
still be statutory employees because the relationship between North-
western and its scholarship football players was predominantly eco-
nomic, not academic.185  Finding that the football players satisfied the
common law agency doctrine, Region 13 held that they could not be
denied employee status just because they were students.186  Conse-
quently, Region 13 declared that Northwestern’s scholarship football
players were employees within the meaning of the NLRA, and or-
dered an election to be held.187  The election results were placed on
hold however because the Board granted review of Northwestern’s
request for review of Region 13’s decision.188
IV. APRIL 24, 2014:  BOARD REVIEW GRANTED
Noting that review was warranted in this case because Region 13’s
decision raised substantial concerns about conflicting legal standards,
182. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at 15.
183. Id. at 15.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id. at 15-16 (arguing that the football players are not primarily students because they
spend a majority of their time on football related activities and those activities are not inextrica-
bly linked to their academic pursuits).
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id. at 1.  Region 13 ordered an election to be held so that the eligible bargaining unit of
football players could vote on whether they wanted to pursue collective bargaining rights with
the University through their elected representative, CAPA.
188. See Northwestern’s Request for Review of Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of
Election, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-
RC-121359?page=4 (arguing that Region 13’s decision should be reversed because it based its
decision on the testimony of a single CAPA witness, and that it ignored the applicability of
Brown); NLRB Grant of Review, supra note 24, at 1 (granting review because Region 13’s deci-
sion raises substantial issues); see also Petitioner’s Response to Request for Review of Regional
Director’s Decision and Direction of Election, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 (Apr. 16,
2014), (http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359?page=4 (opposing Board review of Region 13’s
decision, maintaining that Brown is not applicable to this case because the football players’ du-
ties are irrelevant to their academic pursuits).
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the Board invited the parties, and amici, to file briefs.189  The Board
asked the parties to address whether Brown or the common law
agency doctrine was applicable in determining whether Northwest-
ern’s scholarship football players are employees within the meaning of
the NLRA.190  On July 3, 2014, both CAPA and Northwestern filed
briefs with the Board, which reestablished their claims.191
A. Player 1: CAPA
CAPA claimed the Supreme Court allows for the use of the com-
mon law agency doctrine when Congress does not define the word
“employee” in a statute, and any departure from the common law
“must be based on a statutory policy that clearly requires such a de-
parture.”192  Reasserting that the common law structure is applicable
in this case, CAPA declared that Northwestern’s football players’ em-
ployee status is dependent upon whether they perform services for
and under the control of the University in return for compensation.193
CAPA stated that the evidence presented to Region 13 demon-
strates that the football players perform services for Northwestern
that substantially benefit the University.194  Citing to the testimony of
one former Northwestern football player,195 CAPA claimed that the
student-athletes’ principle time commitment is football because they
treat it like a full time job on a year round basis.196  Additionally,
CAPA contended that since the services provided by Northwestern’s
football players generate millions of dollars per year in revenue for
the University, the football program is a commercial enterprise, not
an extracurricular activity.197
189. Northwestern Univ., No. 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1881179, at 1 (N.L.R.B. May 12, 2014)
(asking the parties to address certain issues including relevant Board precedent and policy
considerations).
190. Id. at *1.
191. Brief for Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 1 (July 3, 2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359?page=1(hereinafter “CAPA’s
Brief to the Board”); Northwestern University’s Brief to the Board on Review of Regional Direc-
tor’s Decision and Direction of Election, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 (July 3, 2014)
(hereinafter “Northwestern’s Brief to the Board), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/13-RC-121359?page
=1.
192. See CAPA’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 8 (citing to Town & Country Electric,
Inc., 516 U.S. at 85).
193. Id. at 9.
194. Id. at 13; see supra note 175.
195. Kain Colter is a former Northwestern football player, co-captain, and a founding mem-
ber of CAPA. See id. at 10.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 14.
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CAPA then asserted that the football players’ duties are subject to
Northwestern control because the coaching staff supervises all activi-
ties.198  To demonstrate its claim, CAPA implored that all football re-
lated activities are mandatory, even the activities labeled
“voluntary.”199  Furthermore, CAPA argued that the football players’
duties are valued above the football players’ academic pursuits be-
cause the football players have to schedule their classes around their
football schedule.200  Even more, CAPA contended that Northwestern
controls the football players’ duties because the athletes have to abide
by special rules that do not apply to other students, and these are
another means of control, which “enhance the benefits Northwestern
derives from the players’ services.”201
Finally, CAPA implored that Northwestern compensates the foot-
ball players for the services they perform because their scholarships
are directly related to the nature of their services.202  CAPA empha-
sized that the football players are recruited solely because of their ath-
letic ability.203  Moreover, CAPA argued that the scholarship awards
are directly related to the services performed because the football
players receive no class credit, and their awards can be reduced or
cancelled at any time for any reason.204  Concluding that the football
players are employees because they satisfy the common law test,
CAPA also considered the intended purpose of the NLRA.205
CAPA declared that allowing student-athletes the right to unionize
so that they can bargain over the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment is consistent with the policy of the NLRA.206  CAPA main-
tained that the relationship between Northwestern and its football
players is predominantly economic and the NLRA was intended to
cover economic, employer-employee relationships.207  CAPA stated
that, since allowing collective bargaining rights is consistent with the
purpose of the NLRA, the Board should not create policy exceptions
to deny those rights to common law employees.208  Lastly, CAPA as-
serted that any policy arguments against the football players’ em-
198. CAPA’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 14.
199. Id. at 14-15.
200. Id. at 16 (referring to the testimony of a Northwestern employee).
201. Id. at 17-18.
202. Id. at 18-20.
203. Id.
204. CAPA’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 19.
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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ployee status are irrelevant to whether they are employees within the
meaning of the NLRA.209
B. Player 2:  Northwestern
Introducing its argument, Northwestern asserted that its scholarship
football players are “first, foremost, and always” students because the
University only admits them after it determines that the student-ath-
letes have the potential to succeed academically.210  Reasserting the
application of Brown, Northwestern maintained that the football play-
ers are primarily students, and that they have a predominantly aca-
demic relationship with the University.211  Northwestern contended
that Region 13’s decision was skewed because it was based on the
testimony of CAPA’s “lone fact witness.”212  Rejecting Region 13’s
use of the common law agency doctrine, Northwestern contended that
the football players are not statutory employees because allowing
them to engage in collective bargaining would “unavoidably entangle
the Board in academic decisions.”213
Arguing that collective bargaining rights should not be extended to
its scholarship football players, Northwestern stated that the Supreme
Court has recognized that academic institutions vastly differ from the
industrial institutions that the NLRA was intended to cover.214
Northwestern argued that Region 13 misapplied the common law test,
which has its roots in the traditional employer-employee relation-
ship.215  Northwestern cited to the Board’s longstanding precedent,
which affirms the use of Brown when deciding the employee status of
university-employed students.216  Northwestern maintained that
Brown is controlling because it recognizes the “unique nature of the
academic setting.”217
Additionally, Northwestern stated that even if the common law
agency doctrine is applicable, the football players are still not statu-
tory employees because their scholarships are not compensation.218
209. Id.
210. Northwestern’s Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 168, at 1.
211. Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 1.
212. See supra note 196.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 14 (citing to Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 672).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 15.
217. Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 14 (explaining that Brown properly
denied the common law structure when determining the employee status of university-employed
students because the Board must consider the academic relationship between the university and
its students).
218. Id. at 34.
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Northwestern claimed that Region 13 ignored the fact that scholar-
ships are wholly different from the wages of the regular faculty, in that
they are not based on performance of services and are not taxable.219
Northwestern also argued that it is immaterial that the football play-
ers are subject to special rules because, like any other extracurricular
activity, “rules are essential for any functioning group activity.”220
Moreover, Northwestern asserted that it is also immaterial that the
University generates revenue from the football program because uni-
versities derive revenue from many other student activities.221  North-
western referred to the undisputed fact that a person cannot come to
the University for the sole purpose of playing football, and that all
students are required to maintain a certain level of academic
excellence.222
Northwestern maintained that if Region 13 had applied Brown, it
would have held that the football players are primarily students, not
statutory employees.223  Ultimately, Northwestern asks that the Board
reverse Region 13’s decision.224  The only question left for the Board
to determine is whether Northwestern’s football players will remain a
unified team or become a unionized regime?225
V. UNIFIED TEAM OR UNIONIZED REGIME?
A. The Playbook
In Town & Country, the Supreme Court gave precedent to the
Board’s interpretation of the term “employee.”226  The Court con-
ceded that in the past, when Congress left the term “employee” unde-
fined in a statute, it assumed that Congress meant to define the term
using the common law agency doctrine.227  However, the Court held
that since Congress created the Board to administer the NLRA, the
Board’s interpretation of vague terms within the NLRA is “entitled to
considerable deference.”228  As such, the Board considers the in-
tended purpose of the NLRA when trying to define a vague term.
The Board has longstanding precedent denying employee status to
those who are primarily students sharing a predominantly academic
219. Id. at 34-35.
220. Id. at 30.
221. Id. at 32.
222. Id. at 2.
223. Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 2.
224. Id. at 1-2.
225. July 8, 2014 marked the deadline for filing briefs with the Board.
226. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. at 89-90, 94; see discussion supra Part I.C.
227. Id. at 94; see supra note 56.
228. Id.; see supra note 59.
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relationship with the university.229  Until NYU, the Board never ap-
plied the common law agency doctrine when determining the em-
ployee status of individuals who were primarily students at the same
universities where they were employed.230  As seen in Adelphi, the
Board considered the students’ community of interest with the regular
faculty, not the common law test.231  Likewise, in Stanford, the
Board’s analysis focused primarily on the nature of the payments re-
ceived by the students, not the common law test.232
The common law test reappeared in BMC when the Board held that
being a student does not automatically eliminate employee status.233
However, the Board’s use of the common law test in BMC was appro-
priate because unlike the individuals in Adelphi and Stanford, the
house staff members in BMC were not students; they were just taking
supplemental courses.234  Furthermore, BMC was a teaching hospital,
not a traditional university like Adelphi and Stanford.235  Had BMC’s
house staff members been pursuing academic degrees at a traditional
academic institution, the Board would have found that they were pri-
marily students, and therefore, not employees within the meaning of
the NLRA.  But the Board incorrectly applied BMC to the NYU case,
which was concerned with individuals who were actually pursuing
their advanced degrees at traditional educational institutions.236
While the Board’s decision in NYU interrupted the longstanding pre-
cedent that the common law test does not apply to student cases, it
was nevertheless reestablished four years later in Brown.237
In Brown, the Board codified its past considerations into a four-
factor analysis, which considered the relationship between the student
and the university.238  The Board clearly rejected the use of the com-
mon law test when determining the employee status of university-em-
ployed students who share a predominantly academic relationship
with their educational institutions.239  Holding that its decision in
NYU was completely erroneous, the Board overruled it and asserted
229. See discussion supra Part II.
230. See id.; cf. BMC, 330 N.L.R.B. at 152 (applying the common law structure because the
individuals in question were not primarily students).
231. See discussion supra Part II.A.
232. See id.
233. See discussion supra Part II.B.
234. See id.
235. See supra note 108.
236. See discussion supra Part II.B.
237. See discussion supra Part II.C.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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that the NLRA does not have jurisdiction in an academic setting.240
Accordingly, the Board’s longstanding pre-NYU precedent and
Brown are controlling when the employee status of students, em-
ployed by and enrolled at the same university, is being determined—
not the common law of agency doctrine.
 Northwestern presents the Board with a novel issue; but just be-
cause the issue is new, it does not mean the Board has to implement a
new line of reasoning.  On the contrary, the Board has a well-estab-
lished rule that individuals who are primarily students are not employ-
ees within the meaning of the NLRA.241  Giving deference to the
Board’s interpretation of the term “employee” as it relates to stu-
dents, it is logical that the Board’s interpretation will be applied to
Northwestern, considering the football players are students.  CAPA ar-
gues that Brown is inapplicable because the Board has never con-
cluded that being a student automatically excludes employee status.242
While the NLRA does not specifically exclude students from em-
ployee status, the Board has consistently held that being a statutory
employee and being primarily a student at the same educational insti-
tution are mutually exclusive.243
B. Brown Breakdown
To determine the employee status of Northwestern’s scholarship
football players, the Board will examine the relationship between the
University and its student-athletes.  Applying Brown, the Board will
consider the following factors: (1) the football players’ status as stu-
dents; (2) the role of their football duties in their education; (3) the
relationship they share with the regular faculty; and (4) the nature of
their scholarships.244
Northwestern’s football players share a predominantly academic re-
lationship with the University because they are primarily students.  To
play football, the student-athletes must first be admitted into North-
western and then they must maintain their status as students.245  Re-
gion 13 stated that the football players would not have been
considered for admission into Northwestern if not for their athletic
ability.246  However, both Northwestern and the NCAA require stu-
240. See id.
241. See discussion supra Part II.
242. CAPA’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 14-15.
243. See discussion supra Part II.
244. See discussion supra Part II.C.
245. Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 5.
246. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at *9.
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dent-athletes to meet certain academic requirements to be eligible for
Division I sports.247  Therefore, Northwestern’s football players would
not have been admitted into the University if not for their academic
achievements.
While the football players do spend many hours dedicated to their
sport,248 their principle time concern is focused on obtaining a North-
western degree, as evidenced by the simple fact that if they do not
maintain a level of academic excellence, they cannot play football.
Even more so than that, the NCAA actually limits the amount of time
student-athletes can dedicate to a sport. 249  Northwestern is dedicated
to helping its football players achieve academically, mandating a class
attendance policy and providing the players a wide range of educa-
tional tools, including private tutors and study skills programs.250
Northwestern’s dedication to its student-athletes’ education is further
exemplified by the fact that it has the highest percentage of graduating
football players of all Division I universities.251  Northwestern’s foot-
ball players are primarily students because being a student-athlete is
predicated on the ability to meet certain academic requirements.
While participating in extracurricular activities is a vital component to
receiving a well-rounded education, ultimately, an individual cannot
go to college just to play football.
Northwestern’s football players share a predominantly academic re-
lationship with the University because playing football is just one as-
pect of obtaining a Northwestern degree.  Northwestern offers
numerous extracurricular activities for its students and these opportu-
nities teach valuable life lessons like leadership, commitment, and
time management.252  The fact that Northwestern does not offer class
credit for performing their football duties indicates just how dedicated
the University is to providing educational courses that require rigor-
ous thinking and active learning.  Northwestern’s scholarship football
players not only get a chance to play for a nationally ranked team but
they also get a world class education at an internationally renowned
educational institution—all for free.
247. Id. at 5-6; 2013-2014 Guide for the College-Bound Student-Athlete, supra note 12, at 9
(requiring that student-athletes graduate from high school with passing test scores in core
courses).
248. See sources cited supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
249. See 2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 15, at 230 (limiting practice times to
a maximum of four hours per day and twenty hours per week).
250. See Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 7-8.
251. Id. at 7.
252. Id. at 3.
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Northwestern’s football players share a predominantly academic re-
lationship with the University because they are fundamentally differ-
ent from the regular faculty who share an economic relationship with
Northwestern.  Northwestern’s regular faculty enjoys the normal ben-
efits of employment, including vacation time, retirement opportuni-
ties, and paid sick leave.  On the other hand, the football players have
access to student-only benefits like health insurance, extracurricular
activities, and financial aid.  A significant indicator that Northwest-
ern’s football players do not share a community of interest with the
regular faculty is the fact that their scholarships, unlike the regular
faculty’s wages, are tax exempt.253
Northwestern’s football players share a predominantly academic re-
lationship with the University because they are offered financial aid,
which helps them pursue their academic degrees.  To get an athletic
scholarship, the football players have to first be enrolled as students at
Northwestern.254  The scholarships allow the football players to afford
the costs of a Northwestern education.  Instead of receiving an actual
payment, the University automatically credits the football players’ stu-
dent accounts.255  The amount that the football players receive is not
based on the nature of the football duties, as evidenced by the fact
that some football players never participate in a single game, yet they
still get scholarship money.256  Moreover, the NCAA specifically pro-
hibits the reduction or cancellation of scholarships before it termi-
nates, unless the student voluntarily withdraws from the team or
becomes ineligible.257  Northwestern cannot reduce or cancel a play-
ers’ scholarship money due to inability to perform or contribute to the
team.258  In the past five years, Northwestern has only denied scholar-
ship renewal twice, and those two non-renewals were based on viola-
tions of rules applicable to all University students.259  Ultimately, the
football players’ scholarships are not related to the performance of
their duties because the scholarships cannot be reduced or canceled
for a players’ inability to perform.
Northwestern proffered more than enough evidence to establish
that it shares a predominantly academic relationship with its football
players.  This is not an economic relationship between an employer
and an employee “grounded on the performance of a given task where
253. Id. at 6-7.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 6-7.
257. See 2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 15, at 199.
258. See id.
259. Northwestern’s Brief to the Board, supra note 192, at 4.
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both the task and the time of its performance is designed and con-
trolled by an employer.”260  Rather, the relationship between North-
western and its football players is one “where the students have
chosen an activity on which to spend the time necessary, as deter-
mined by the activity’s need.”261  A predominantly academic, univer-
sity-student relationship does not fit into the strict structure of the
common law test, which was designed to determine economic, em-
ployer-employee relationships.262
C. Common Law Shakedown
The Board has never applied the common law agency doctrine as it
relates to the employee status of students.  In BMC, the common law
test was appropriate because the individuals in question were not stu-
dents.263  And the Board’s use of the common law test in NYU was
distinctly overruled in Brown.264  Even if the Board applied the com-
mon law test to the Northwestern case, the football players would still
not gain employee status.
The football players are choosing to participate in an extracurricu-
lar activity while pursuing their Northwestern degrees.  The duties
they perform for the activities they voluntarily chose to participate in
are not services just because they benefit Northwestern.  Furthermore,
it is irrelevant that the football players perform their duties under the
control of Northwestern.  The university-student relationship is predi-
cated on the University asserting some aspect of control over its stu-
dents.  Northwestern’s football players choose to play football, and for
any group activity to run efficiently there must be an aspect of control.
However, the existence of an aspect of control over the football play-
ers’ duties does not mean that the players’ scholarships are related to
those duties.  According to Region 13, the distinguishing factor be-
tween Northwestern’s scholarship football players and “walk-on”
players was the receipt of payments, but the scholarships are not com-
pensation.265  Thus, because the players do not receive compensation
under the common law test, they are excluded from employee status.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Northwestern’s football players sat-
isfy the common law test, they would still not be statutory employees
because such status would be inconsistent with the intended purpose
260. Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 621.
261. Id.
262. See cases cited supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
263. See discussion supra Part V.A.
264. See discussion supra Part II.C.
265. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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of the NLRA.266  The NLRA was not intended to cover academic re-
lationships and the issues arising from that relationship.  However,
Region 13 rejected Northwestern’s argument that just because CAPA
might try to bargain over academic issues, it does not mean that they
will.267  Region 13 refused to deny employee status based on specula-
tion.268  But the contention that CAPA might try to bargain over aca-
demic issues is anything but speculative.
In CAPA’s initial petition to Region 13, it indicated that one of its
main goals was to bargain with Northwestern over additional financial
aid for the football players.269  First, CAPA cannot argue for addi-
tional financial aid when its main basis for asserting common law em-
ployee status is that the scholarships are not financial aid but are
instead compensation.  Second, however the scholarships are catego-
rized, they are inextricably linked to the football players’ academic
pursuits because they are used solely for the purpose of obtaining a
Northwestern degree.  It would unequivocally interfere with North-
western’s academic freedoms if CAPA were allowed to bargain with
the University over an issue that could determine the football players’
status as students.  Still considering the intended purpose of the
NLRA, there are many other policy reasons for denying Northwest-
ern’s football players’ employee status.
D. Sideline Considerations
Extending collective bargaining rights to Northwestern’s scholar-
ship football players would have a chaotic effect on all NCAA football
teams, because the Board’s decision would only apply to private uni-
versities.270  Scholarship football players at public universities would
be disadvantaged competitively compared to their counterparts at pri-
vate universities who would be allowed to bargain for improved
health and safety standards and additional financial aid.  Region 13’s
decision would not only create an unequal playing field between
NCAA football teams, but it could potentially affect all NCAA sports.
Region 13’s sole basis for extending NLRA employee status to
Northwestern’s scholarship football players was that they perform ser-
vices for the University in return for compensation.271  Presumably, all
266. See discussion supra Part II.C.
267. Region 13’s Decision, supra note 20, at *14.
268. Id.
269. CAPA’s Post-Hearing Brief, supra note 17, at *1.
270. Jurisdictional Standards, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/
rights-we-protect/jurisdictional-standards (last visited Aug. 16, 2014) (explaining that the Board
only has statutory jurisdiction over private sector employees).
271. See discussion supra Part III.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPS\11-1\DPS101.txt unknown Seq: 33  7-MAY-15 10:46
2015] NORTHWESTERN’S FOOTBALL PLAYERS 33
scholarship-receiving student-athletes at private universities would be
granted employee status because they are working in exchange for
compensation.  Therefore, Region 13’s decision could create a level of
unfair competition among all NCAA sponsored sports.
Allowing Northwestern’s scholarship football players to bargain
collectively with the University could actually cause more harm to the
student-athletes than good.  The IRS specifically excludes scholarship
grants from taxation unless services are required to receive the pay-
ment.272  Affirming Region 13’s decision would be to admit that the
football players’ scholarships are based on service performance, and
this admission would necessitate taxation of their scholarships.  Taxing
the football players’ scholarships would be counterintuitive to
CAPA’s bargaining goal seeking additional financial aid for the stu-
dent-athletes.273
Similarly, affording the football players’ collective bargaining rights
would not actually improve the health and safety issues that they are
concerned with.  The football players seek to bargain over rules that
are actually implemented by the NCAA, not Northwestern, and the
NCAA is under no obligation to bargain with student-athletes.
Northwestern, on the other hand, is not only obligated to adhere to
NCAA rules and regulations or risk possible sanctions, but it is also
obligated to bargain with its scholarship football players or risk unfair
labor practice charges.274
Northwestern’s “Catch-22” demonstrates the exact policy concerns
the Board considers when analyzing the intended purpose of the
NLRA.  Essentially, allowing Northwestern’s scholarship football
players the right to unionize would effectuate a lose-lose situation for
all of the parties involved because the student-athletes would gain
nothing from bargaining, Northwestern would be stuck between a
rock and a hard place, and fairness in competition of all NCAA sports
would be dismantled.  Thus, student-athletes are not employees within
the intended purpose and meaning of the NLRA.
272. 26 U.S.C. §§ 117 (a), (b)(1).
273. The football players seek employee status to bargain for more financial aid, but em-
ployee status necessitates taxation of scholarships, which would effectuate a loss in the actual
amount of financial aid the athletes are already receiving from Northwestern.
274. For example, if the Board allows the student-athletes to unionize, they could potentially
seek to bargain over compensation.  Northwestern is required to at least bargain with them or it
will face unfair labor practice charges from the Board.  However, the NCAA prohibits the
schools from compensating their student-athletes because of amateurism requirements.  If
Northwestern bargained with its football players over compensation, they risk possible sanctions
from the NCAA.
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VI. POST-GAME ANALYSIS
The NLRA was intended to cover the predominantly economic,
employer-employee relationship because conflicting economic inter-
ests define the relationship.275  The university-student relationship is
defined by mutual academic interests—mainly, the education of the
student.276  Since the case of first instance,277 the Board has consist-
ently held that it does not have jurisdiction over predominantly aca-
demic relationships because it would be inconsistent with the purpose
of the NLRA.278  Furthermore, longstanding Board precedent denies
the application of the common law agency doctrine when its determi-
nation involves individuals who are primarily students employed by
and enrolled at traditional educational institutions.279
The essence of Northwestern’s relationship with its football players
is predominantly academic, not economic.  Northwestern is a tradi-
tional educational institution and its football players are primarily stu-
dents.  As such, Brown must be applied, Region 13’s decision must be
reversed, and employee status must be denied.  Nonetheless, the
Board may overrule itself, just as it did in Brown, and affirm Region
13’s decision.
While precedent strongly favors the Board reversing Region 13’s
decision, political factors may influence a different outcome.280  In
June 2014, the Supreme Court invalidated the President’s recess ap-
pointments to the Board.281  However, the President is attempting to
ensure that the Board maintains its Democratic majority for the next
several years.282  The Board has already denied review of a regional
decision granting employee status to medical residents, fellows, and
interns.283  As it did with BMC, the Board could use its current rea-
275. Employers are seeking to create a product or provide a service for the cheapest means
possible, and employees are seeking to earn as much compensation as they can for the services
they provide. See discussion supra Part II.C.
276. Id.
277. See Adelphi, 195 N.L.R.B. at 639.  For discussion and holding of Adelphi, see supra Part
II.A.
278. See discussion supra Part II.
279. See id.
280. The Board is currently controlled by a Democratic majority due to three controversial
recess appointments made by the President in 2011. See Dube, Obama Will Again Nominate
Block to NLRB; Attorney Held Invalid Recess Appointment, supra note 26.
281. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (ruling that the NLRB lacked properly
appointed members to have a quorum).
282. See Dube, Obama Will Again Nominate Block to NLRB; Attorney Held Invalid Recess
Appointment, supra note 26 (noting that the President is likely to achieve Senate confirmation of
his nominee for the Board).
283. See case cited supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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soning to erroneously extend employee status to student-athletes as it
did with the graduate assistants in NYU.
In any event, whether the Board affirms, reverses, or modifies Re-
gion 13’s decision, there will be ramifications because of the vast num-
ber of interested parties.284  There is also great potential for
Northwestern to face judicial review by the Supreme Court since the
novel issue has caused conflicting applications of the law.  Neverthe-
less, Board precedent should prevail and student-athletes should be
denied employee status within the meaning of the NLRA.  With
Board review currently pending, the only question to be determined
now is whether Northwestern University’s football players will remain
a unified team or transform into a unionized regime.
284. Interested parties include Northwestern University, other private and even public univer-
sities, CAPA, other student labor organizations, student-athletes, students, the NCAA, etc.
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